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A RIGHT TO TESTIMONY OF IMMUNIZED DEFENSE
WITNESSES
In 1980, the court of appealsfor the Third Circuit, in Govern-
ment of Virgin Islands v. Smith, held that a defendant's ri ht to
evidence in a criminal trial included a right to immunity /or his
witnesses. Since that time, the district court of Maryland has
similarly upheld, in United States v. Lyon, a defendant's right
to testimony even though the witness may require immunity.
This article discusses the competing interests weighingfor and
against defense witness immunity and suggests that once it is de-
termined that a defendant has a right to certain testimony, it is
proper to burden the government with a choice of alternatives to
ensure the defendant that right.
I. INTRODUCTION
In criminal prosecutions, the state may frequently resort to the im-
munized testimony of a third party to inculpate the defendants.' De-
fendants, as yet, have no power to grant immunity to similarly situated
witnesses who might be willing to testify for them. Thus, defendants
may be denied material and exculpatory testimony because defense
witnesses, fearing criminal prosecution based on their testimony, assert
their fifth amendment right not to testify.
However, defendants may be able to compel the government to
choose among several burdensome alternatives, including granting im-
munity to a defense witness or having the prosecution postponed or
dismissed. Recent decisions in the federal courts have upheld a right to
the testimony of immunized defense witnesses, based on the defend-
ant's due process rights to material and exculpatory evidence.2
This comment explores cases precluding review of the prosecutor's
decision to withold immunity from defense witnesses under the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, except upon a showing of prosecutorial bad
faith. It then examines the cases that suggest that in certain situations
the defendant may have a right to the testimony of immunized wit-
nesses. The separation of powers doctrine is then juxtaposed with the
defendant's right to evidence. In conclusion, this comment suggests
that courts may be obligated to impose substantial burdens on the gov-
ernment to vindicate a defendant's due process right to evidence.
1. Witnesses cannot be compelled to proffer self-incriminating testimony. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment is applicable to both state and federal
governments. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 53, 53 (1964). The State,
however, can compel testimony over a fifth amendment claim through a grant of
immunity. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Ullman v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976).
2. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Lyon, No. J-81-0118 (D.
Md. Sept. 21, 1981) (unpublished order).
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II. BACKGROUND
The majority of federal and state courts deny defendants' requests
for defense witness immunity.3 A few federal courts have carved a nar-
row exception to this rule, compelling the state to grant immunity upon
a showing of prosecutorial misconduct or bad faith.4 One recent deci-
sion, however, has unconditionally upheld a defendant's right to mate-
rial and exculpatory testimony elicited through witness immunity.5
A. Decisions Denying Requests for Defense Witness Immunity
Most federal courts which have addressed defense witness immu-
nity have routinely rejected motions to review a prosecutor's decision
to deny it.6 These decisions state that the separation of powers doctrine
either commits the decision of whether to grant witness immunity
solely to the prosecutor,' or precludes defense witness immunity in the
absence of a legislative enactment. 8
In a comprehensive opinion invoking the separation of powers
3. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1077 (1981); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 519 (4th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub. nom. La
Duca v. United States, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 96
(2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 67 (3d
Cir. 1978); United States v. Benueniste, 564 F.2d 335, 339 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977); In re
Daley, 549 F.2d. 469, 478-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Daley v. Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Comm., 434 U.S. 829 (1977); United States v.
Smith, 542 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237,
249 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nont Hoff v. United States, 429 U.S. 819
(1976); Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
933 (1975); United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 976 (1975); United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494-95
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975); Cerda v. United States, 488 F.2d
720, 723 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 190 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Jenkins, 470
F.2d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973); United
States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 512-13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nornL Lyscyk v.
United States, 393 U.S. 846 (1968); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C.
Cir.), rehearing denied en banc, 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388
U.S. 921 (1967).
There are few reported state cases that deal with defense witness immunity,
probably because most litigants attempting to vindicate a constitutional right seek
out a federal forum. When applied for, it is normally denied on motion at the
lower court level without opinion. In contrast to state courts, federal district
courts publish most of their decisions.
4. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
5. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
6. See sources cited supra note 3.
7. United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 1978), cert denied sub. nom. La
Duca v. United States, 440 U.S. 972 (1979).
8. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1201 (3d Ci. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 913 (1979). To date, no statute empowers a defendant to immunize his own
witnesses for the purpose of obtaining material and exculpatory evidence.
doctrine to preclude review of the prosecutor's decision to withold de-
fense witness immunity, the court of appeals for the Second Circuit, in
United States v. Turkish,9 propounded numerous public concerns
which it believed precluded wresting the immunity decision from the
prosecutor. These public concerns convinced the court that discretion
over whether to grant immunity should rest with branches of govern-
ment more accountable to the public than the judiciary.'0
Primarily, the court's opinion expressed concern that the grant of
use immunity"1 to a defense witness placed a "heavy burden" upon the
government in any later prosecution of the witness. 12 While use immu-
nity theoretically puts the government and the witness in the same posi-
tion as though the witness had never testified, 3 the government bears
the burden of proving that the testimony given by the witness is essen-
tially separate from evidence that may later be introduced to prosecute
the witness. This burden is not easily met and oftentimes shields the
witness from prosecution when the witness' testimony is a tempting and
fertile source of "leads"' 4 or appears to focus an investigation on the
witness.' 5 In addition, when the witness under immunity confesses, the
prosecution may have difficulty proving that the evidence of the wit-
ness' criminal conduct is separate in source from the witness' testi-
mony. Consequently, when the prosecution indicts an innocent party
who produces the wrongdoer to testify under immunity, the criminal
conduct at issue is likely to go unpunished.
The court also feared that defense witness immunity would sub-
vert the guilt-determining process.' 6 Specifically, the court expressed
concern that an immunized witness-cohort would falsely confess to the
crime in question at the defendant's trial. At the subsequent trial of the
witness-cohort, the original (and now acquitted) defendant would then
confess for the witness-cohort. While either or both parties risk prose-
9. 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
10. 623 F.2d at 775-76.
11. A grant of use immunity keeps the state from using the witness' testimony either
as evidence or to obtain leads in a later prosecution of that witness. In the later
rosecution, the state must prove that their incriminating evidence was obtained
rom a separate source. Transactional immunity, on the other hand, keeps the
state from later prosecuting the witness for any crime relating to the transaction
on which he testified. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see also 18
U.S.C. § 6002 (1976) (Federal Use Immunity Act).
12. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1077 (1981).
13. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972); see, e.g., Recent Develop-
ments, Constitutional Law: Application of Immunity Statute to Related Testimony
Compelled During Pendency of Appeal, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 178, 181 (1966).
14. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15. Comment, Self-Incrimination and the States. Restricting the Balance, 73 Yale L.J.
1491, 1495 (1964).
16. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1077 (1981).
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cution for perjury,' 7 co-defendants might not hesitate to falsely confess
under immunity if the perjured testimony assures acquittal on a more
serious charge. Thus, to the extent that a defense witness' immunized
testimony is inherently perjured, it impairs the reliability of the fact-
finding process.
A third concern of the court is that it did not want to add a new
defense right to the "procedural imbalance in favor of the defendant"
at trial.' 8 Judge Lombard's concurrence elaborated on this point, not-
ing that every claim for defense witness immunity could require a pre-
liminary hearing on whether the right is applicable.19 Defendants may
reap unwarranted benefit from such procedural delays and abuse the
defense witness immunity right by protracted preliminary hearings.2 °
Such delaying tactics might dangerously tip the "balance of power" at
trial to the defendant, and consequently impair the fact-finding process.
A fourth concern the court recognized was the possibility that a
defense witness might seek to cloak himself from subsequent prosecu-
tion by blurting out irrelevant, self-incriminating statements while
testifying under immunity.2 The court, however, dismissed this "im-
munity bath" dilemma as inconsequential given that irrelevant or irre-
sponsive answers by prosecution witnesses are technically not protected
under an immunity grant.2 2 However, other courts have used this "im-
munity bath" dilemma to argue against defense witness immunity.23
Two other policy concerns weighing against defense witness im-
munity were not raised by the Turkish court. However, the prominence
these concerns are given by other courts merit their examination. One
of the concerns was discussed by Chief Justice Burger, then a circuit
judge, in Earl v. United States.2 4 In Earl, Justice Burger stated that the
overuse of defense witness immunity might invade legitimate privacy
17. The court noted that the threat of a perjury conviction would not deter false
swearing when the substantive crime carried penalties far in excess of those for a
perjury conviction. ld; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976).
18. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1077 (1981).
19. 623 F.2d at 779-80 (Lombard, J., concurring).
20. Note, The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence: The Defendant's Constitu-
tional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1211, 1234 (1977-78).
21. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1077 (1981).
22. 623 F.2d at 775.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1978). But cf. Comment,
The Fifih Amendment Testimonial Privilege as an Impediment to the Defense When
Invoked by a Potential Exculpatory Witness, 42 Alb. L. Rev. 482 (1978). The fifth
amendment privilege "may be invoked properly only when a witness has reason-
able cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer." Id at 485. The privilege
can be restricted to preclude its collision with the defendant's evidentiary rights by
an in camera examination of the witness. Id at 488.
24. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied en banc 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
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interests of potential witnesses.2 5 When a witness objects to testifying
despite a grant of immunity, privacy rights, often accorded constitu-
tional stature,26 arguably outweigh a defendant's right to evidence.27
A more general policy concern weighing against defense witness
immunity is that immunity is a judicially disfavored mechanism for
obtaining testimony at trial.28 Any defense right granting the power to
immunize witnesses would accord the immunity doctrine more judicial
stature than it deserves. Implying the above, the court in Morrison v.
United States29 asserted that the defendant's failure to produce an
otherwise available witness was not reasonably equated with the gov-
ernment's refusal to immunize the witness.30 In other words, the court
believed that immunity was too insignificant in our criminal justice sys-
tem to realistically include the government's immunity power among
the arsenal of government-employed weapons for gathering evidence.
Thus, the Morrison court believed that the government's immunity
powers should not be considered when courts contemplate how best to
vindicate a defendant's right to evidence.31
In sum, the public policy concerns raised by Turkish, Earl, and
Morrison weigh against removing the immunity decision from the
prosecutor.32 In support of this position, the Federal Witness Immu-
nity Act requires that the prosecutor grant witness immunity only when
in the "public interest."' 33 Courts ruling against defense witness immu-
nity have noted that it is generally improper for the judicial branch to
weigh the public interest.34
B. Prosecutorial Bad Faith
The prosecutor's decision to deny immunity to a defense witness
25. 361 F.2d at 534.
26. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
27. A grant of use immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976) can only be made by the
prosecutor, who must weigh the public interest in obtaining the witness' testimony
over the witness' privacy rights. United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 192-93
(10th Cir. 1980). A fundamental right is thus denied only upon a showing of
compelling governmental interest. J. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 111-19, at
384 (1977). When a defendant seeks witness immunity, such compelling govern-
mental interest is arguably absent.
28. Morrison v. United States, 365 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
29. 365 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
30. Id at 524.
31. The strength of this assertion comes into question when one considers that witness
immunity has long been considered part of our "constitutional fabric." Ullman v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
32. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1077 (1981).
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976); see also United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191,
1200-01 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d
1215, 1219 (4th Cir. 1973).
34. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1200 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 913 (1979).
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has not always been considered beyond judicial review, even by courts
that generally considered immunity power within the sole discretion of
the executive branch. The refusal to grant immunity, when coupled
with some example of prosecutorial bad faith, has in some cases trig-
gered review of an otherwise discretionary executive decision despite
the separation of powers doctrine.
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith3 5 the prosecutor misused
his discretionary authority in witholding defense witness immunity. In
that case, authorities charged with prosecuting the witness 36 agreed to
grant use immunity to him. However, the authorities conditioned the
immunity grant on the United States Attorney's formal consent. With-
out articulating a reason, the United States Attorney witheld his con-
sent to the immunity grant.37 Judge Garth, writing for the Third
Circuit, held that the actions of the United States Attorney were taken
with the deliberate intention of distorting the fact-finding process.
Therefore, the district court, on remand, was ordered to dismiss the
indictments unless statutory use immunity was granted to the witness
for his testimony.38 In sum, the prosecutor misused his discretionary
authority by groundlessly witholding immunity from the defense
witness. 9
In addition, when the prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity is
clearly intended to impede the defendant's attempt to make an effec-
tive defense, the prosecutor has abused his discretionary power. In
United States v. Morrison, " the Third Circuit reviewed the decision of
the prosecutor to deny immunity to a defense witness. After denying
the defendant's request for witness immunity,4' the prosecutor called
the witness into his office to threaten her with prosecution if she testi-
fied for the defendant.42 The court found the T3rosecutor's action com-
pletely unnecessary and highly intimidating. These actions, which
practically precluded the witness from volunteering testimony,
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct denying the defendant due pro-
cess of law." Such an abuse of discretion entitled the defendant to
35. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
36. The witness was a minor who came under the exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile
authorities. Id at 967.
37. Id at 969.
38. Id
39. Id The court surmised that the United States Attorney's decision to deny immu-
nity was based on litigation strategy.
40. 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
41. Id at 227.
42. Id at 225-26.
43. Id at 228.
44. Id., at 229. The court quoted at length from the Supreme Court's opinion in Webb
v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972). In Webb, the trial judge intimidated a witness from
testifying, in anticipation that the defense's sole witness was about to commit per-
jury. The Court found the witness intimidation to be a denial of due process. Id
at 98.
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judicial review of the prosecutor's act and to compel immunity for the
defense witness.4"
C. Due Process Right to Defense Witness Immunity
As mentioned earlier, the position adopted by most federal courts
today is that the separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial re-
view of the prosecutor's decision to deny defense witness immunity. A
narrow exception to this rule permits judicial review upon a showing of
prosecutorial misconduct. Nevertheless, a few cases suggest that de-
fendants may have a much broader due process right to witness immu-
nity in certain circumstances.
1. Equal Powers Analysis
Several cases suggest that defendants may have a due process right
to witness immunity only when the government grants immunity to one
of their witnesses.' Ostensibly, the prosecutor and the defendant both
have equal immunity powers in any given trial. However, the prosecu-
tion would still decide if immunity is available at all in any given
case.4 7 Notably, no case has yet to actually confer immunity to a de-
fense witness because no prosecutor immunized any of his own
witnesses.
In United States v. Earl,48 then Judge Burger for the District of
Columbia court of appeals found no violation of due process when the
defendant's motion to compel witness immunity of a co-defendant was
denied. The court, in a footnote, posited that defense witness immunity
may be required when the government itself immunized a prosecution
witness.49 The court believed that should a prosecutor also fail to im-
munize a defense witness, the Federal Witness Immunity Act, "as ap-
plied" to a defendant in a particular case, might result in a denial of
due process.5
In United States Y. Turkish,s l however, the Second Circuit not only
raised policy considerations precluding review of the prosecutor in his
decision over witness immunity, but also explicitly rejected the proposi-
45. United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228-29 (3d Cir. 1976).
46. This proposition was first raised by a footnote in Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d
531, 534 n.l (D.C. Cir.); rehearing denied en bane, 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967); accord United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); United States v. Allstate Mortgage
Corp., 507 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975); United
States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975).
47. In each instance, the proposition seemed to be considered as an afterthought; no
court looked with favor upon defense witness immunity under any theory. See
sources cited surpa note 46.
48. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied en bane, 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
49. 361 F.2d at 534 n.l.
50. Id
51. 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
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tion that the due process clause mandated equal powers for the defend-
ant and prosecution at trial.52 The court noted that due process did not
mandate the defendant's access to a state's police and investigatory
powers.53 Consequently, denying the defendant equal access with the
state to witness immunity did not violate the due process clause.
2. The Right to Testimony
Two recent decisions have applied a defendant's due process right
to material and exculpatory testimony at trial to uphold a defendant's
right to testimony elicited through an immunized witness. Unlike the
equal powers approach, the defendant would have this right regardless
of whether the prosecution uses immunized testimony to prosecute the
defendant.
In United States v. Lyon, 54 the district court of Maryland, in an
unpublished order by Judge Jones, directed the government to respect
the defendant's due process right to testimony by either granting his
witness immunity, trying the witness first, or dismissing the indict-
ment.55 The defendant, Campbell, persuaded the court to sever his
trial from that of his co-defendants so as to make available to him, at
trial, prior testimony given by the co-defendants under immunity.56
However, Campbell's own defense also required his co-defendants' live
testimony as well.57 Thus, he simultaneously filed a motion requesting
either defense witness immunity or trial of the co-defendants preceed-
ing his own. Granting either motion would free the co-defendants to
offer live exculpatory testimony for Campbell. The court granted both
motions as to one co-defendant, leaving the prosecution with the option
of immunizing the defense witness or trying the witnesses first.
58
The Lyons court never addressed the separation of powers issue in
considering witness immunity for Campbell, perhaps because the court
did not have to confront witness immunity as the sole alternative to
dismissing Campbell's indictment.59 Instead, the court confined its in-
quiry to whether the defendant had a due process right to the type of
52. 623 F.2d at 774.
53. Id
54. No. J-81-0118 (D. Md. Sept. 21, 1981) (unpublished order).
55. Id at 19.
56. Id at 18.
57. Id at 12.
58. Id at 19.
59. The witness in Lyon never requested witness immunity for defendant Campbell.
Had he requested such testimony, and had Campbell's testimony been found to be
material and exculpatory to the co-defendant/witness' trial, the court may have
been confronted with an "immunity bind." Unable to try either defendant first,
the court might then have been forced to decide on the right to defense witness
testimony where immunity and indictment dismissal were the only available alter-
natives. Confronting the prosecutor with such a burdensome choice might well
have intruded into the prosecutor's discretionary power over immunity.
19831
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testimony requested.6" Once the court found the co-defendant's testi-
mony necessary for Campbell's trial, it refused to allow the trial to pro-
ceed without it.6
In a similar application of the due process clause, the court in Gov-
ernment of Virgin Islands v. Smith62 compelled the public prosecutor to
either grant defense witness immunity or dismiss the indictment. In
Smith, the Third Circuit ruled that when witness testimony is material
and exculpatory a court may fashion immunity for a defense witness,
absent strong governmental interests that countervail the immunity
grant.63 For example, when the witness is also a key co-defendant
whose immunization would frustrate the witness' own prosecution, a
grant of immunity may be so costly to the state that the prosecution
would rather dismiss the indictment than have the witness immunized.
The court's holding, briefly addressing this hypothetical dilemma,'
balks at dismissing the indictment. Under these circumstances, the
government's interest in not granting immunity might outweigh the de-
fendant's right to testimony. 65 Nevertheless, the opinion stated that ab-
sent strong countervailing governmental interest, when the testimony
required is both material and exculpatory due process mandates the
defense witness' immunization.66
Smith may be questionable authority to assert the existence of a
due process right to defense witness immunity because the case also
involved a misuse of prosecutorial discretion. 67 Thus, the latter half of
the opinion addressing defense witness immunity generally might be
considered unnecessary to the court's holding. Yet, while perhaps dic-
tum, most of Judge Garth's opinion in Smith gives defense witness im-
munity its most expansive judicial expression to date.
III. ANALYSIS
Many courts have denied a defendant's request for witness immu-
nity based on the separation of powers doctrine, consequently entrust-
ing the decision to the discretion of the prosecutor in the absence of a
legislative enactment. 6 Essentially, the strength of this separation of
powers rationale lies in strong public policy concerns surrounding the
immunity decision suggesting that the authority to immunize witnesses
60. Id
61. Id
62. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
63. Id at 973-74.
64. Id at 973.
65. Id
66. Id at 974.
67. Id
68. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1077 (1981); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1201 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied sub nom. La Duca v. United States, 440 U.S. 972 (1979).
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should be left with the public prosecutor.69 The proposition, well-
stated in United States v. Herman ,70 is that "public interest" review
would necessarily require the court to weigh, if only in limited circum-
stances, considerations that are traditionally associated with the deci-
sion to prosecute.7 Thus, any judicial review of the immunity decision
must necessarily trench seriously upon the authority of the executive
branch.72
However, decisions such as United States v. Lyon7" and Govern-
ment of Virgin Islands v. Smith 74 uphold a general due process right to
testimony of immunized defense witnesses, irrespective of separation of
powers concerns that have traditionally precluded judicial review.
While these decisions do not directly address the issue, they seemingly
challenge the validity of employing the separation of powers doctrine
to deny a defendant's motion for immunized witness testimony. In
these cases the courts were more concerned with vindicating constitu-
tional rights75 and protecting their own process from abuse76 than pro-
tecting the executive branch's prerogative over immunity. In Lyon, the
court did not assert inherent power to confer "judicial" immunity, but
still ordered the defendant's access to material and exculpatory evi-
dence by requiring the indictment's dismissal unless the government
decided to make material evidence available.77 In this manner, the
technical decision over immunity was still the government's, but the
court enforced the defendant's constitutional right to evidence."
Ultimately, there is a significant distinction between compelling a
prosecutor to choose among several burdensome alternatives and
usurping the prosecutor by judicially ordering witness immunity. Logi-
cally, as long as the prosecutor can still choose to withhold witness im-
munity executive prerogative is not technically invaded.7 9 Unlike the
69. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077
(1981).
70. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
71. 589 F.2d at 1203-04.
72. Id
73. No. J-81-0118 (D. Md. Sept. 21, 1981) (unpublished order).
74. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
75. The Court has time and again reaffirmed the principle that constitutional rights
should not go unremedied. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
76. United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.), cert denied sub
nonL Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. v. United States, 396 U.S. 820 (1969)
(despite federal act precluding disclosure of depositions and hearings from public,
district court possessed inherent equitable power to enforce protective order
prohibiting disclosure of divestiture plans and to so protect judicial processes from
abuse); accord In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 1977).
77. This alternative was considered and rejected in Morrison v. United States, 365
F.2d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
78. United States v. Lyon, No. J-81-0118 (D. Md. Sept. 21, 1981) (unpublished order);
see also Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
79. It is generally well acknowledged that the prosecutor should be given much dis-
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judicial usurpation of a prosecutorial decision,8" courts frequently
impose burdensome alternatives on the prosecution to vindicate a de-
fendant's right to evidence.' Thus, provided a defendant has a consti-
tutional right to present the kind of evidence often elicited by a defense
witness under immunity, it seems logical that courts may impose a
choice of burdens, including immunity, upon the prosecution to vindi-
cate that right. The remainder of this article will discuss the defend-
ant's right to the kind of evidence elicited under immunity and the
imposition of burdensome alternatives to secure its availability to the
defendant.
A. The Due Process Right to Evidence
Generally, a defendant's best claim for witness immunity rests
with the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments.8 2
Due process is not susceptible to literal and limiting interpretations
8 3
given other guarantees such as the sixth amendment.84 Rather, due
cretion in determining whether immunizing a witness for his testimony is in the
public interest. In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973).
80. If the court mandated witness immunity for a defense witness, the prosecutor
would have absolutely no discretion over the immunity decision.
81. Courts have invaded, if not usurped, areas of prosecutorial power. In the so-
called "informant" cases, prosecutors were forced by the courts to either reveal
their sources and forgo later investigations, or dismiss the indictment at hand.
Oftentimes, such "invasions" are couched in language that infers a "balancing" of
the public interest (protected by the government) against the individual's right to
prepare his defense (protected by courts). Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53,
62 (1957). In such cases, the government may still uphold the public interest, and
refuse to comply with the act vindicating the defendant's right to evidence, but
"only at the price of letting the defendant go free." Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657, 671 (1957).
82. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.
83. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 109 (1974-75).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Some writers believe that defense witness immunity
"falls squarely within the language and purpose of the compulsory process
clause." Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 168
(1974-75). This belief is, to a large degree, premised upon the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the sixth amendment in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967):
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attend-
ance, if necessary, is, in plain terms the right to present a defense, the
right to present the defendant's version of thefacts as well as the prosecu-
tion's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. . . . This right is
a fundamental element of due process of law.
Id at 19 (emphasis added). The above-quoted language has been used to suggest
that the compulsory process clause includes a right to "evidence." Westen, The
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 150 (1974-75). Since compul-
sory process by definition places an affirmative burden on the prosecution to pro-
duce a witness, id at 123, it is argued that the state must bring forth all evidence
under its control. Id at 168. Furthermore, "[t]he government's peculiar control
over potentially exculpatory witnesses imposes a constitutional obligation on it to
immunize the witnesses to obtain evidence in the defendant's favor." Id at 167;
see also, Comment, Right of the Criminal Defendant to the Compelled Testimony of
Witnesses, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 952 (1967); Note,A Re-examination of Defense Wit-
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process rights are arrived at by "a general process of inclusion or exclu-
sion,"85 or resorting to "logical deduction," 6 premising each expansion
of the right upon other similar expansions or applications. Aside from
a case-by-case analysis, due process rights have in the past been expan-
sively defined as those which are essential to a "scheme of ordered lib-
erty,"87 or entail "fundamental [principles of] liberty and justice."88
Cases authoritatively interpreting the due process clause have upheld
defense evidentiary rights which are analogous, if not identical in
scope, to testimony of immunized defense witnesses. Given that new
due process rights are most often logical extensions of older due process
rights, these cases strongly support the defendant's due process right to
testimony of immunized defense witnesses.
In Chambers v. Mississipp, 89 the Supreme Court addressed a de-
fendant's due process right to testimonial evidence. In that case the
defendant, Chambers, was shot twice by a fatally wounded policeman
who apparently took deliberate aim at the fleeing defendant. The pros-
ecution introduced the evidence of the dying policeman's final shots as
substantive proof of the criminal agency of the defendant. At trial,
Chambers asserted that McDonald shot the officer and attempted to
introduce four separate hearsay confessions of McDonald who was dis-
missed from prosecution on the same charge. 90
At trial, McDonald's repudiated confessions were not admitted
ness Immunity: A New Use for Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 74 (1972); Note,
The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1266 (1978).
However, the facts of Washington suggest a much narrower interpretation. In
the case, the Texas statute which the Court struck down precluded the testimony
of a co-defendant at the trial of the accused, after the co-defendant had himself
been convicted. No grant of immunity was required, as the co-defendant could
no longer be subject to criminal prosecution. Thus, the sixth amendment only
compelled the witness' presence, not testimony. "[T]he right exists only to the
extent that witnesses may otherwise be compelled to attend and to testify ....
[But], there is no right (under the sixth amendment) to compel testimony over a
claim of recognized privilege .. " People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d 160, 359 N.E.2d
688, 691, 391 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (N.Y. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); ac-
cord United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1077 (1981); United States v. Lacoutine, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974). In sum, given that the sixth amendment contains
very "specific" rights, its very specificity makes it less subject to liberal, nonliteral
interpretation. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71,
108-09, 127 (1974-75). Westen argues for application of the sixth amendment to
defense witness immunity situations, stating that its specificity has greater prece-
dential sway. Id at 130. However, Westen fails to recognize that by its very
specificity, the amendment may not be applicable.
85. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
86. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criti-
cism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 333 (1957).
87. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
88. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
89. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
90. Id at 289.
into evidence because of the hearsay rule.9' When Chambers at-
tempted to call McDonald as an adverse witness, he was precluded by
the trial court on the basis of Mississippi's "voucher rule."92
The Supreme Court ordered both the live testimony of the adverse
witness and his hearsay confessions to be admitted into trial. The
Court noted that, generally, hearsay testimony would be excluded to
prevent the admission of evidence with a high degree of untrustworthi-
ness.9 3 In this case, however, the Court found the out-of-court con-
fessions inherently reliable, for the same confession was made on nu-
merous occasions.94 In addition, the confessions were statements
against the witness' penal interest which are uniformly recognized as a
hearsay rule exception.95
With regard to the calling of McDonald as an adverse witness, the
Court held that:
The right of cross examination is a more desirable rule of trial
procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of confron-
tation and helps assure the accuracy of the truth determining
process. . . . [Its] denial calls into question the . . . integrity
of the fact-finding process . . . . [Clompeting interests must
be closely examined.96
Thus, the Court suggested that evidence material to the defendant's
guilt or innocence and inherently trustworthy must be admitted into
evidence, without regard to mechanistic state rules to the contrary.97
The Chambers holding is similar to the issue of a defendant's right
to immunized exculpatory testimony in several major respects. First,
Chambers generally upholds a defendant's due process right to testimo-
nial evidence. 8 Second, the Court upheld the defendant's due process
right to call a defense witness who would probably exculpate the de-
fendant by confessing his own criminal conduct. 99 Third, the adverse
witness' testimony was admissible, despite the fact of an earlier dismis-
sal of charges against him."o This, coupled with the apparent absence
of any "lead" incriminating the adverse witness and the overall stale-
ness of any evidence to the shooting,'' probably rendered the witness
91. Id. at 293.
92. Id. In this case, "the defendant's request to examine McDonald, the adverse wit-
ness, was denied on the basis of [the voucher] rule that a party may not impeach
his own witness. . . . [A] party who calls a witness 'vouches for his credibility.' "
Id at 295 (citing 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 896, at 658-60).
93. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973).
94. Id at 300.
95. Id at 299.
96. Id at 295.
97. Id. at 302.
98. Id.
99. "To the extent that McDonald's sworn confession tended to incriminate him, it
intended also to exculpate Chambers." Id. at 297.
100. Id. at 288.
101. The shooting occurred in 1969. Id at 285. McDonald was arraigned before a
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"immune" from prosecution for the crime.' 02 Thus, Chambers seems to
address and discount the concern raised by courts that a witness' im-
munity from prosecution enhances the risk that his confession to the
criminal act is perjured.'0 3 In sum, Chambers offers some support for
the contention that a defendant has a due process right to present evi-
dence similar to that which would be elicited in the defense witness
immunity situation. Judge Garth in Smith, 'o citing Chambers at
length, held that a defendant's due process right to "exculpatory evi-
dence"' 1 5 and "to present an effective defense' includes evidence
that would be elicited under immunity. The court found the denial to
the defendant of the use of exculpatory evidence in Smith no different
in substance from the denial found in Chambers. 107
The due process right to testimony asserted in Chambers, however,
is not precisely applicable to the defense witness immunity situation.
In Chambers, the witness was adverse; he would not freely confess and
have the defendant acquitted. Rather, the defendant wanted to im-
peach the adverse witness with out-of-court confessions. 0 8 When a de-
fense witness with immunity testifies, however, it is more likely that he
will confess to exculpate the defendant. The court in Chambers found
the witness' disinterest in exculpating Chambers"° and the inherent
credibility of repeated out-of-court confessions 110 material to the de-
fendant's due process right to evidence. Thus, the witness' impaired
credibility in the defense witness immunity situation might cut against
a defendant's right to testimony.
However, a witness' impaired credibility may not be relevant to
the defendant's due process right to testimonial evidence. Justice
Harlan's brief concurrence in Washington v. Texas, "' which addressed
the defendant's due process right to testimonial evidence, held that a
justice of the peace soon after giving a sworn confession. Released shortly there-
after, his role in the murder would never be investigated to any degree. Id at 288.
102. Aside from McDonald's repudiated confession, there was no evidence of any in-
volvement on his part in the shooting. Authorities clearly lacked sufficient evi-
dence to bring McDonald to trial. Additionally, McDonald's testimony would
not shed any light on his role in the homicide. Rather, Chambers wanted Mc-
Donald called to repudiate the sworn confession, so that the confession could be
used to impeach McDonald's credibility and lend credence to Chambers' story
that McDonald had perpetrated the crime. Because no new evidence would sur-
face by way of McDonald's testimony, McDonald would remain virtually "im-
mune" from prosecution for the crime, or at least beyond the government's reach
due to lack of sufficient evidence. Id at 291-92.
103. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1077 (1981).
104. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980).
105. Id at 971.
106. Id
107. Id at 970.
108. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 292 (1973).
109. Id at 297-98.
110. Id at 300-01.
111. 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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witness' unreliability had no bearing on the defendant's due process
right to the witness' testimony. In Washington, a defendant wanted his
co-defendant to testify. The co-defendant had already been convicted
and was serving a sentence. Two Texas statutes" 2 precluded the de-
fendant from calling his convicted co-defendant as a witness due to
credibility reasons. The Court struck down the Texas statute as violat-
ing the defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process.
1 3
Justice Harlan did not join the majority in applying the sixth amend-
ment to the States under the fourteenth amendment. Rather, his
concurrence focused upon the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause." 4 Justice Harlan stated that when the state did not bar con-
victed co-defendants as prosecution witnesses, it could not assert credi-
bility reasons to bar them as defense witnesses." 5
Justice Harlan's interpretation of the due process clause is relevant
to the defense witness immunity situation. The prosecution makes use
of an immunized witness when his testimony is material to the defend-
ant's guilt."16 Consequently, the arbitrary exclusion of immunized wit-
ness testimony on reliability grounds when it aids the defendant would
be a violation of due process.
Both Justice Harlan's concurrence and the Court's opinion in
Washington offer additional persuasive support for the defendant's
right to the kind of evidence elicited from immunized defense wit-
nesses. In Washington, the convicted co-defendant was willing to con-
fess and exculpate Washington." 7 Additionally, the co-defendant
would be, for practical purposes, immune from prosecution for his con-
fession by virtue of his prior conviction. Disregarding risks of perjury
"inherent" in the confessions of co-defendants insulated from later
prosecution, both the majority opinion" 8 and Harlan's concurrence" 9
expressly found the co-defendant's testimony competent. Therefore,
the defendant in Washington had a due process right to the same kind
of evidence that would likely be elicited from immunized defense
witnesses.
B. Imposing Burdens
Once it has been determined that a defendant has a constitutional
112. See id at 16 n.4.
113. Id at 23.
114. Id at 24-25 (Harlan, J., concurring).
115. Id at 25.
116. "Immunity statutes are, of course, ordinarily for the benefit of the government,
designed to effectively serve the compelling needs of the criminal justice system by
preventing a substantial avoidance of prosecution and penalty." United States v.
Dunn, 577 F.2d 119, 126 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 100
(1979); see 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
117. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967).
118. Id at 19-23.
119. Id at 24-25 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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right to certain witness testimony, a judicial obligation arises to protect
that right. One means of enforcing that right would be to compel the
prosecutor to grant immunity. 20 Such an order would be a judicial
usurpation of what is normally the executive branch's prerogative.'
2
'
Courts have often avoided the "usurpation" issue by asking the prose-
cutor to select among a number of unfavorable alternatives, 2 2 any one
of which would protect the defendant's constitutional right. Possibly, a
court could "burden" the state with a witness immunity alternative
when enforcing the defendant's due process right to testimony.
In Brady v. Maryland, 2 3 the Supreme Court compelled the prose-
cution to choose among several unfavorable alternatives, illustrating
the judicial imposition of alternative burdens to protect constitutional
rights. The Brady Court placed affirmative burdens upon the govern-
ment to assist the defendant in procuring evidence for trial. The de-
fendant requested that he be allowed to examine the extra-judicial
statements of the co-defendant in the murder trial then in the posses-
sion of the prosecutor. One statement by a co-defendant, admitting to
the homicide, was withheld by the prosecutor and not revealed to the
defendant's counsel until after conviction and sentencing. The evi-
dence suppressed was held to be material to both guilt and
sentencing. 2
4
The Court held that the prosecutor violated the defendant's due
process right by withholding evidence favorable to the defendant, "irre-
spective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. "125 Brady
suggests that it is incumbent upon a court to impose the burden on the
state to turn over evidence within its control when the evidence is mate-
rial and exculpatory. The state's statutory authority over immunity
similarly puts a defendant's exculpatory testimony under the prosecu-
tor's control. Once the state is made aware of a witness' exculpatory
testimony, and when that witness asserts his fifth amendment privilege,
the state should similarly be burdened to "turn over" this evidence with
a grant of immunity.
Both the Brady holding and the granting of defense witness immu-
nity burdens the state by compelling the surrender of evidence that
may help the defendant at trial. In an immunity case the prosecution
may be compelled to forgo the additional prerogative of prosecuting
the witness.'26 Yet, other Supreme Court precedent upholds the de-
120. Such an order is appropriately entitled "judicial immunity." See Government of
Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1980).
121. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1200 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 441
U.S. 913 (1979).
122. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957).
123. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
124. Id at 87.
125. Id
126. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 459-62 (1972). An immunized witness to
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fendant's right to evidence, even at the expense of later criminal inves-
tigations and prosecutions.1 27  For example, in Jencks v. United
States, 128 the defendant sought an order to inspect witness reports
given to the F.B.I. These reports were used to apprehend the defendant
for violating the National Labor Relations Act and were highly mate-
rial to the defendant's case.' 29 The government, invoking its privilege
against source disclosure, attempted to withold the witness reports from
the defendant. However, the Court found that the defendant could not
be tried without access to these material, and perhaps exculpatory, re-
ports and ordered the indictments dismissed unless the government re-
linquished its privilege against disclosure, 30 thereby risking the loss of
these anonymous sources to aid with later prosecutions. As a necessary
incident to the defendant's due process right, the prosecutor was com-
pelled to choose between two difficult and burdensome alternatives.
In another "informer's privilege" case, Roviaro v. United States, 131
the Court held that the informer's privilege must again "give way"
when disclosure of either the informer's identity or the contents of his
communication is relevant and helpful to the accused.' 32 The prose-
cution would either have to disclose the information or dismiss the
action. ' 33
Roviaro suggests that affirmative burdens of disclosure which jeop-
ardize later investigations do not outweigh a due process right to rele-
vant and material evidence. Never does the Court suggest that a due
process right may be limited or witheld because of burdens or costs to
the state.
Two recent defense witness immunity cases, discussed earlier, im-
posed substantial burdens on the state in enforcing the defendant's
right to material and exculpatory evidence. In United States v. Lyon ,1
the Maryland district court ordered the government to either grant wit-
ness immunity, try the witness first, or dismiss the indictment pursuant
to the defendant's due process right to material and exculpatory testi-
mony. The government was not burdened to the extent that immunity
or dismissal was compelled. The witness, who did not request the de-
fendant's testimony at his trial, could be tried first.' 35 Nonetheless, the
a criminal prosecution cannot later be tried for the same crime unless the prosecu-
tion demonstrates "legitimate independant sources" for the incriminating infor-
mation. Id at 462.
127. See sources cited supra note 122.
128. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
129. Id at 667.
130. Id at 671-72.
131. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
132. Id at 60-6 1.
133. Id at 67.
134. United States v. Lyon, No. J-81-0118 (D. Md. Sept. 21, 1981) (unpublished order).
135. Id at 8. In the more typical immunity situation, both co-defendants would re-
quest immunity for the other co-defendant, and so free his cohort's testimony for
trial. Consequently, the state would be placed in the undesirable position of de-
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defendant's right to exculpatory evidence was deemed significant
enough to displace the government's interest in either deciding the or-
der of prosecution or burdening the state with an immunity grant. At
the very least, the prosecutor was still compelled to prosecute the wit-
ness first and possibly reveal valuable and exculpatory evidence to the
defendant. 36 In sum, this "choice" of burdens was less severe than if
the state had been compelled to elect between immunity or dismissal.
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 131 the Third Circuit or-
dered the state to either immunize the defense witness or dismiss the
indictment. Despite ordering what the court called "judicial" immu-
nity, it still provided the state with a choice of burdens, leaving the
ultimate decision over immunity to the prosecutor. However, the court
did not endorse "judicial" immunity in every instance when evidence
denied the defendant by a silent witness is material and exculpatory.
When "strong governmental interests . . . countervail against a grant
of immunity"138 or immunity to the defense witness "would entail sig-
nificant costs to [the government], it would be appropriate for the im-
munity application to be denied."' 39 The court, however, did not
elaborate on what "significant costs" might prove too burdensome for
the state in an immunity situation. Given that Judge Garth's holding
fashioned "judicial" immunity for defense witnesses, finding "substan-
tial costs" would probably be a matter of judicial discretion. Yet, when
a court deems its proper role as only imposing a "choice of burdens,"
and not supplanting the prosecutor's discretion, the standard for "sub-
stantial costs" should be more narrowly defined.
Several rules should guide a court in protecting the defendant's
constitutional right and preserving prosecutorial discretion. When the
burden of immunizing the defense witness becomes so great that the
prosecutor realistically has no choice but to dismiss the indictment the
application for immunity should be denied. For example, in a case
where the witness' crime is heinous and immunity would effectively
shield him from prosecution, a judicial decision to impose a choice of
either immunity or indictment dismissal would effectively rob the pros-
ecution of any choice over whether or not to grant immunity:. the ne-
cessity of prosecuting the witness would force the prosecutor to dismiss
the defendant's indictment. The separation of powers doctrine should
in this instance properly preclude a court from forcing the prosecution
to choose between burdens. 4 ° The court might still be able to compel
ciding which co-defendant was less culpable, and electing to prosecute the other
first.
136. Id. at 19.
137. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
138. Id at 972.
139. Id at 973.
140. The Third Circuit in Smith favored denying a defendant's request for witness
immunity under this same situation. Although Judge Garth did not see his hold-
ing as consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, in theory it may well be.
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a "missing witness" instruction for the defendant,' 4' but the immunity
alternative should, upon preliminary review by the court, be
withheld. 
42
On the other hand, unless the prosecutor can prove at a prelimi-
nary hearing that he had no choice but to dismiss the indictment, the
state should be forced to choose among either the immunity grant, an
indictment dismissal, or postponement of the defendant's trial so as to
prosecute the witness first. As stated earlier, permitting defendants a
preliminary hearing to determine whether to grant defense witness im-
munity, with incident procedural delays, does not necessarily outweigh
vindicating a fundamental defense right. 43
IV. CONCLUSION
The separation of powers doctrine properly precludes judicially
fashioned immunity for defense witnesses, absent a prosecutor's abuse
of discretion. However, entrusting the discretionary power over immu-
nity to the prosecutor may not mitigate against a defendant's right to
testimony, even when compelled through witness immunity. In most
141. But cf. Morrison v. United States, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In Aorri-
son, the defendant argued that the government's immunity power put the witness
under the government's control. Thus, the government's failure to produce the
witness should have empowered the trial judge to instruct the jury that an "ad-
verse inference" could be drawn from the government's failure to elicit the same
privileged testimony under an immunity grant. Then Judge Burger held that the
government's refusal to use the immunity power could not be equated with the
"failure of a litigant to produce an otherwise available witness." Id
142. Weighing the state's "substantial costs" to defeat or otherwise limit the defend-
ant's due process right to material evidence finds some support in United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In Nixon, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
executive privilege when confronted with a defendant's fifth and sixth amendment
rights.
When the Watergate Special Prosecutor subpoenaed certain tapes of conver-
sations by the President to aid in the prosecution of seven Watergate co-defend-
ants, the President asserted a claim of executive privilege and refused to produce
the subpoenaed evidence. In upholding and enforcing the prosecutor's subpoena
against the President, the Supreme Court considered the co-defendant's fifth and
sixth amendment rights "to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial." Id
at 711. The Court's holding "weigh[ed] the importance of the general privilege of
confidentiality of Presidential communications ...against .... " in part, the
fifth and sixth amendment rights of the defendants, as well as other considerations
relevant to the "fair administration of criminal justice." Id at 711-12.
The Court did hold, however, that upon a showing of "specific need" the
defendant's rights to evidence, encompassed in the "demands of due process of
law in the fair administration of criminal justice," could be defeated. Id at 713.
President Nixon, in this case, simply failed to make a showing of specific need.
The standard of "specific need" seems somewhat analogous to the "substantial
cost" standard in Smith. The "substantial cost" doctrine, in turn, seems to hinge
on a separation of powers analysis.
143. Courts have an unremitting responsibility to vindicate constitutional rights at al-
most any cost, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816), and to preserve the fair and even-handed nature of the
judicial process. In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977).
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instances defendants should have the right to the testimony of immu-
nized defense witnesses, when that testimony is material and exculpa-
tory. Applying the due process clause, some courts have upheld a
defendant's right to place a choice of burdens on the state, including
immunity, to obtain that evidence. Only when the burden of immuniz-
ing the witness becomes so severe that it robs the prosecutor of a realis-
tic choice over whether to immunize the witness or not should the
request for witness immunity be denied.
Howard Simon Klein
